## Indicator 1.8: Budget

About this indicator

Annual budget legislation, and any associated legislation related to government revenue-raising and expenditure, are among the most important pieces of legislation considered by parliament. In democratic systems, parliament plays a key role in approving and overseeing the raising and spending of public funds on behalf of citizens. Whereas revenue-raising is usually considered a part of the normal law-making process, the spending of funds constitutes a special function, and many parliaments therefore have separate finance (raising) and budget (spending) committees.

This indicator concerns parliament’s role at all stages of the annual budget cycle. The first broad phase of this cycle, known as “ex-ante review”, involves the formulation and examination of the draft budget, the proposal of amendments by MPs, and the approval of the budget. The second phase, known as “ex-post review”, comprises the oversight of budget execution after the budget has been passed.

A specialized parliamentary body, such as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), as well as other committees and the supreme audit institution, typically play a significant role in this scrutiny process.

As budgetary knowledge and scrutiny are specialized areas, this indicator also concerns the expert support available to parliament to help it fulfil its role.

This indicator comprises the following dimensions:

* Dimension 1.8.1: Formulation, examination, amendment and approval
* Dimension 1.8.2: In-year and ex-post oversight
* Dimension 1.8.3: Public Accounts Committee
* Dimension 1.8.4: Expert support
* Dimension 1.8.5: Supreme audit institution

See also *Dimension 1.1.3: Budgetary autonomy* and *Dimension 5.1.4: Gender-responsive budgeting*.

### Dimension 1.8.1: Formulation, examination, amendment and approval

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| This dimension is part of:* Indicator 1.8: Budget
* Target 1: Effective parliament
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About this dimension

This dimension concerns all aspects of the process by which parliament considers and approves budget legislation, and the annual budget in particular. The draft budget represents the executive’s statement of priorities and commitments, and can include both revenue and expenditure proposals, although this is not the case in all parliaments.

The process of parliamentary consideration of the budget commences with the formulation of the budget and its presentation to parliament. The budget is then examined and deliberated by parliament, and may be amended during this process. The final step is the approval of the budget by parliament.

In many jurisdictions, parliament plays a substantial role in formulating the budget. This enables parliament to influence the content of the budget. Parliamentary involvement in this stage can also facilitate the later passage of the budget through parliament.

To help parliament properly consider the budget, it should be accompanied by detailed information, including about the proposals its contains, the budget’s effect on different groups in society – such as women, youth, people with disabilities, and disadvantaged and minority groups – and any short- and long-term trends in the country’s budgetary position. The executive and its agencies are responsible for providing such information.

The budget examination process should give MPs an opportunity to scrutinize and amend the budget before voting to approve it.

See also *Dimension 1.1.3: Budgetary autonomy*, *Dimension 3.1.3: Transparency of the budget cycle and the parliamentary budget* and *Dimension 5.1.3: Gender mainstreaming*.

Aspiring goal

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| *Based on a global comparative analysis, an aspiring goal for parliaments in the area of “formulation, examination, amendment and approval” is as follows:*The legal framework establishes clear arrangements covering all aspects of parliament’s consideration of budget legislation. Only parliament can give final approval to budget legislation.The executive presents the draft budget to parliament along with detailed supporting information about its proposals and its effect on different groups in society. There is sufficient time and opportunity for scrutiny of budget legislation, including by the opposition and/or minority parties. Parliament is substantially involved in the process of formulating the budget. Parliament is able to influence its content and to amend the draft budget. Any limits on the scope of amendments that can be proposed by MPs are reasonable and clearly defined. |

Assessment

This dimension is assessed against several criteria, each of which should be evaluated separately. For each criterion, select one of the six descriptive grades (Non-existent, Rudimentary, Basic, Good, Very good and Excellent) that best reflects the situation in your parliament, and provide details of the evidence on which this assessment is based.

The evidence for assessment of this dimension could include the following:

* Provisions of the constitution, other aspects of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure relating to parliament’s consideration and approval of budget legislation
* Information about the involvement of MPs, members of the public, civil society and others in budget formulation
* Statistics on the time spent on budget consideration, and on the involvement of different groups of MPs, such as opposition, minority-party and independent MPs
* Proposed amendments to budget legislation
* Records of budget approval

Where relevant, provide additional comments or examples that support the assessment.

#### Assessment criterion 1: Legal framework

The legal framework establishes clear arrangements covering all aspects of parliament’s consideration of budget legislation. Only parliament can give final approval to budget legislation.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 2: Information about the draft budget

The executive presents the draft budget to parliament along with detailed supporting information about its proposals and its effect on different groups in society.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 3: Time available for budget consideration

There is sufficient time and opportunity for scrutiny of budget legislation, including by the opposition and/or minority parties.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 4: Ability to influence the budget

Parliament is substantially involved in the process of formulating the budget. Parliament is able to influence its content and to amend the draft budget. Any limits on the scope of amendments that can be proposed by MPs are reasonable and clearly defined.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 5: Practice

In practice, the budget is presented to parliament within the time frame defined by law. Budget consideration in committee and in the plenary is substantive and in line with parliament’s rules of procedures. Parliament approves the budget in a way and within a time frame defined by law or its rules of procedure.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

Recommendations for change

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| *Use this space to note down recommendations and ideas for strengthening rules and practice in this area.* |

Sources and further reading

* David Beetham, [*Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*](http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf) (2006).
* Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), [*Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislators*](https://issuu.com/theparliamentarian/docs/recommended_benchmarks_for_democrat), revised edition (2018).
* National Democratic Institute (NDI), [*Towards the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures*](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2113_gov_standards_010107_5.pdf) (2007).
* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [*OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency*](https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/Best%20Practices%20Budget%20Transparency%20-%20complete%20with%20cover%20page.pdf) (2002).
* OECD, [*Recommendation of the Council on Budgetary Governance*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Recommendation-of-the-Council-on-Budgetary-Governance.pdf) (2015).
* OECD, [*Parliament’s role in budgeting*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Parliament-role-in-budgeting.pdf) (2019).
* Franklin De Vrieze, [*Keeping an eye on the money we don’t have. Parliament’s oversight role on public debt*](https://www.agora-parl.org/blog/keeping-eye-money-we-dont-have-parliaments-oversight-role-public-debt) (2022).

### Dimension 1.8.2: In-year and ex-post oversight

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| This dimension is part of:* Indicator 1.8: Budget
* Target 1: Effective parliament
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About this dimension

This dimension concerns the provisions and processes by which parliament exercises in-year and ex-post oversight of the budget.

Parliament’s role does not end once it has approved the budget. Beyond this point, it is important for parliament to monitor budget execution, including whether the funds have been spent on the purposes for which they were approved. Parliament can carry out this oversight in a number of ways:

* Conducting periodic in-year review of actual government spending, based on monthly and/or quarterly reports on budget execution
* Requiring agencies funded by the budget to report to parliament on the details and outcomes of their budget expenditure in a way that is accessible to parliament
* Using its committee system to examine the spending of the agencies that fall within each committee’s area of responsibility
* Including, in its rules of procedure, provisions that allow for budgetary outcomes to be subject to discussion and debate in parliament, including opportunities for the opposition and/or minority parties

Ex-post oversight allows parliament to scrutinize of the outcomes of the previous budget, which can then inform its consideration of the current budget.

See also *Dimension 1.8.3: Public Accounts Committee*, *Dimension 1.8.4: Expert support* and *Dimension 1.8.5: Supreme audit institution*, which cover important parts of the ex-post oversight framework in detail.

Aspiring goal

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| *Based on a global comparative analysis, an aspiring goal for parliaments in the area of “in-year and ex-post oversight” is as follows:*The legal framework provides for periodic in-year and ex-post oversight of budget execution by permanent committees such as the budget committee and/or the PAC.Agencies funded by the budget are required to account fully to parliament for their budgetary expenditure and outcomes through regular and comprehensive reporting.Parliamentary committees systematically inquire into the budgetary expenditure and outcomes of executive agencies for which they have responsibility. MPs have the right to receive information that is needed for effective ex-post oversight, subject to legally defined limitations.Parliament’s rules of procedure allow for budgetary outcomes to be subject to discussion and debate in parliament, including opportunities for the opposition and/or minority parties. |

Assessment

This dimension is assessed against several criteria, each of which should be evaluated separately. For each criterion, select one of the six descriptive grades (Non-existent, Rudimentary, Basic, Good, Very good and Excellent) that best reflects the situation in your parliament, and provide details of the evidence on which this assessment is based.

The evidence for assessment of this dimension could include the following:

* Provisions of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure requiring agencies funded by the budget to account fully to parliament for their budgetary expenditure and outcomes through regular and comprehensive reporting
* Provisions of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure relating to committee scrutiny of the budgetary outcomes of executive agencies
* Committee reports on budgetary scrutiny of agencies
* Provisions of parliament’s rules of procedure providing for opportunities to debate budgetary outcomes
* Statistics on parliamentary debates on budgetary outcomes

Where relevant, provide additional comments or examples that support the assessment.

#### Assessment criterion 1: Role of parliament

Parliament’s budget committee, PAC or equivalent bodies conduct periodic in-year review of the execution of the budget as a whole, or of certain parts of the budget, either at their own initiative, or based on the government’s monthly and/or quarterly reports on budget execution.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 2: Reporting to parliament

Agencies funded by the budget are required to account fully to parliament for their budgetary expenditure and outcomes through regular and comprehensive reporting.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 3: Scrutiny by parliamentary committees

Parliamentary committees systematically inquire into the budgetary expenditure and outcomes of executive agencies for which they have responsibility, and have access to the information that is needed for effective ex-post oversight, subject to legally defined limitations.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 4: Debate of budgetary outcomes

Budgetary outcomes are subject to discussion and debate in parliament, including opportunities for the opposition and minority parties.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 5: Practice

In practice, budget scrutiny and the debate of budgetary outcomes are regular and meaningful, with wide participation by MPs. Information on budget scrutiny is made publicly available.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

Recommendations for change

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| *Use this space to note down recommendations and ideas for strengthening rules and practice in this area.* |

Sources and further reading

* David Beetham, [*Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*](http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf) (2006).
* Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), [*Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislators*](https://issuu.com/theparliamentarian/docs/recommended_benchmarks_for_democrat), revised edition (2018).
* National Democratic Institute (NDI), [*Towards the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures*](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2113_gov_standards_010107_5.pdf) (2007).
* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [*OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency*](https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/Best%20Practices%20Budget%20Transparency%20-%20complete%20with%20cover%20page.pdf) (2002).
* OECD, [*Recommendation of the Council on Budgetary Governance*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Recommendation-of-the-Council-on-Budgetary-Governance.pdf) (2015).
* OECD, [*Parliament’s role in budgeting*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Parliament-role-in-budgeting.pdf) (2019).

### Dimension 1.8.3: Public Accounts Committee

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| This dimension is part of:* Indicator 1.8: Budget
* Target 1: Effective parliament
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About this dimension

This dimension concerns the role and activities of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), budget committee, or the equivalent body that is responsible for, or has a role in, scrutiny of the budget both before and after its passage through parliament.

The roles of the PAC may include the following:

* Providing information to assist with formulating and debating the budget
* Conducting ex-post oversight of government expenditure
* Examining the financial affairs or performance of any government entity
* Receiving and examining reports from the supreme audit institution
* Promoting the efficient, effective and corruption-free expenditure of public funds

In order to perform its role effectively, the PAC needs to have authority and powers derived from the legal framework and parliament’s rules of procedure. Such authority and powers include the PAC’s mandate, its membership, and its power to obtain records and information from government entities in relation to budgetary matters.

The membership of the PAC should reflect the important role played by the opposition and minority parties in budget scrutiny. In some parliaments, it is a requirement that the chair of the PAC be a member of the opposition.

Aspiring goal

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| *Based on a global comparative analysis, an aspiring goal for parliaments in the area of “Public Accounts Committee” is as follows:*The legal framework establishes the PAC as parliament’s primary oversight body in relation to budgetary matters. The PAC has a broad mandate to fulfil its budgetary oversight duties and to assess the performance of entities funded by the budget.Parliament’s rules of procedure require that opposition and/or minority parties be represented proportionally in the membership of the PAC and, ideally, that the PAC be chaired by a member of these parties.The PAC has the authority to require entities funded by the budget to provide it with records and information about their budgets and performance. Such information is readily accessible to parliament.The PAC is adequately resourced to enable it to exercise its mandate on behalf of parliament. |

Assessment

This dimension is assessed against several criteria, each of which should be evaluated separately. For each criterion, select one of the six descriptive grades (Non-existent, Rudimentary, Basic, Good, Very good and Excellent) that best reflects the situation in your parliament, and provide details of the evidence on which this assessment is based.

The evidence for assessment of this dimension could include the following:

* Provisions of the constitution, other aspects of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure establishing a PAC (or similar committee) and granting it authority and powers
* Provisions of the constitution, other aspects of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure relating to the mandate and membership of the PAC
* Examples of PAC reports
* Evidence of the availability of adequate financial and human resources to enable the PAC to exercise its mandate

Where relevant, provide additional comments or examples that support the assessment.

#### Assessment criterion 1: Legal framework

The legal framework establishes the PAC as parliament’s primary oversight body in relation to budgetary matters. The PAC has a broad mandate to fulfil its budgetary oversight duties and to assess the performance of entities funded by the budget.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 2: Composition

Parliament’s rules of procedure require that opposition and/or minority parties be represented proportionally in the membership of the PAC and, ideally, that the PAC be chaired by a member of these parties.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 3: Access to information

Entities funded by the budget are required to provide the PAC with records and information about their budgets and performance. Such information is readily accessible to parliament.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 4: Resources

The PAC is adequately resourced to enable it to exercise its mandate on behalf of parliament.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 5: Practice

In practice, the PAC plays an active role in parliament’s scrutiny of the budget. It regularly informs parliament and the public about the outcomes of its budget scrutiny.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

Recommendations for change

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| *Use this space to note down recommendations and ideas for strengthening rules and practice in this area.* |

Sources and further reading

* David Beetham, [*Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*](http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf) (2006).
* Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), [*Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislators*](https://issuu.com/theparliamentarian/docs/recommended_benchmarks_for_democrat), revised edition (2018).
* National Democratic Institute (NDI), [*Towards the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures*](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2113_gov_standards_010107_5.pdf) (2007).
* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [*OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency*](https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/Best%20Practices%20Budget%20Transparency%20-%20complete%20with%20cover%20page.pdf) (2002).
* OECD, [*Recommendation of the Council on Budgetary Governance*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Recommendation-of-the-Council-on-Budgetary-Governance.pdf) (2015).
* OECD, [*Parliament’s role in budgeting*](https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Parliament-role-in-budgeting.pdf) (2019).

### Dimension 1.8.4: Expert support

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| This dimension is part of:* Indicator 1.8: Budget
* Target 1: Effective parliament
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About this dimension

This dimension concerns the expert support available to MPs to enable them to effectively scrutinize the budget, and government financial management and performance. In this specialist area, parliament needs information and expertise in order to hold the executive to account for the use of public resources.

Although the executive is expected to provide detailed and transparent information to parliament about the budget, parliament needs its own sources of expertise, including to help it evaluate this official information.

Some parliaments have a well-resourced, independent parliamentary budget office with the expertise to provide parliament with independent commentary and information on the budget, including analysing current budgets and long-term budgetary trends, and evaluating budgetary outcomes. Others have budgetary analysis and scrutiny experts among committee staff, or within their research or other related services.

Parliament should also be able to access available expertise in the community, such as academics, civil society organizations, think tanks and professional associations. Parliament could engage with such experts through the work of parliamentary committees including the PAC, or through political parties or individual MPs who wish to pursue particular areas of interest. These outside experts can also provide valuable perspectives on how the budget impacts different groups in society such as women, youth and people with disabilities, as well as disadvantaged and minority groups.

Aspiring goal

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| *Based on a global comparative analysis, an aspiring goal for parliaments in the area of “expert support” is as follows:*Parliament has a parliamentary budget office or other specialized support service that has sufficient funding and expertise to provide expert support and advice on budgetary matters. Parliament routinely engages with external sources of expertise throughout the budget cycle, and seeks to gain a perspective on how the budget impacts different groups in society. MPs have access to specialized training to build capacity to scrutinize the budget.  |

**Assessment**

This dimension is assessed against several criteria, each of which should be evaluated separately. For each criterion, select one of the six descriptive grades (Non-existent, Rudimentary, Basic, Good, Very good and Excellent) that best reflects the situation in your parliament, and provide details of the evidence on which this assessment is based.

The evidence for assessment of this dimension could include the following:

* Provisions of the constitution, other aspects of the legal framework and/or parliament’s rules of procedure establishing a parliamentary budget office or other specialized support service on budgetary matters
* Details of the resources available to the parliamentary budget office or other specialized support service on budgetary matters
* Reports of the parliamentary budget office or other specialized support service on budgetary matters
* Evidence of engagement with external sources of expertise on budgetary matters

Where relevant, provide additional comments or examples that support the assessment.

#### Assessment criterion 1: Internal resources

Parliament has a parliamentary budget office or other specialized support service that has sufficient funding and expertise to provide expert support and advice on budgetary matters.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 2: External sources of expertise

Parliament routinely engages with external sources of expertise throughout the budget cycle, and seeks to gain a perspective on how the budget impacts different groups in society.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 3: Capacity building

MPs have access to specialized training to build capacity to scrutinize the budget.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 4: Practice

In practice, MPs are well-equipped to scrutinize the budget and have access to and engage with a wide range of internal and external sources of expertise and advice on budgetary matters.

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| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

Recommendations for change

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| *Use this space to note down recommendations and ideas for strengthening rules and practice in this area.* |

Sources and further reading

* David Beetham, [*Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*](http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf) (2006).
* Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), [*Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislators*](https://issuu.com/theparliamentarian/docs/recommended_benchmarks_for_democrat), revised edition (2018).
* National Democratic Institute (NDI), [*Towards the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures*](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2113_gov_standards_010107_5.pdf) (2007).

### Dimension 1.8.5 Supreme audit institution

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| This dimension is part of:* Indicator 1.8: Budget
* Target 1: Effective parliament
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About this dimension

This dimension concerns the supreme audit institution (SAI) as the body responsible for auditing public financial administration and the management of public funds. The SAI plays a central role in the efficient, effective, transparent and accountable use of the public resources approved by parliament through the annual budget process.

The SAI is an important, independent source of information for parliament about budget outcomes and performance. Through its reporting to parliament and the public, the SAI provides information to the public about the use of public funds, thereby acting as a significant check on possible misuse of, or corruption in relation to, public funds.

The SAI should have a sufficiently broad mandate, and should audit both the legality and regularity of the accounts of the entities it audits. It should also conduct performance audits, which examine the efficiency and effectiveness of public entities and programmes. An independent SAI is therefore an essential body in a democratic system.

Aspiring goal

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| *Based on a global comparative analysis, an aspiring goal for parliaments in the area of “supreme audit institution” is as follows:*The constitution and/or other aspects of the legal framework provide the basis for the existence, functions and powers of the SAI, which is independent of the executive and the entities it audits.Members of the SAI enjoy independence in terms of their appointment to, and cessation of, office, and are persons of integrity and competence. The SAI has access to the entities it audits and their records and documents, and has the power to require a response to its findings. The SAI has the funding and expert staff necessary to perform its audit functions. Parliament and the SAI have a special relationship, which is legally defined and well-functioning in practice. The SAI is legally required to report regularly and independently to parliament and the public. |

Assessment

This dimension is assessed against several criteria, each of which should be evaluated separately. For each criterion, select one of the six descriptive grades (Non-existent, Rudimentary, Basic, Good, Very good and Excellent) that best reflects the situation in your parliament, and provide details of the evidence on which this assessment is based.

The evidence for assessment of this dimension could include the following:

* Provisions of the constitution and/or other aspects of the legal framework establishing an independent SAI, and outlining its membership, powers, mandate, resources and reporting requirements
* Information relating to the mandate, resources and powers of the SAI
* Examples of SAI reports and findings

Where relevant, provide additional comments or examples that support the assessment.

#### Assessment criterion 1: Legal framework

The constitution and/or other aspects of the legal framework provide the basis for the existence, functions and powers of the SAI, and define the entities that it audits.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 2: Independence of members

SAI members are independent of the executive and the entities that they audit. Members enjoy independence in terms of their appointment to, and cessation of, office, and are persons of integrity and competence.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 3: Independence of mandate and resources

The SAI has access to the entities it audits and their records and documents, and has the power to require a response to its findings. The SAI has the funding and expert staff necessary to perform its audit functions.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 4: Relationship between parliament and the SAI

Parliament and the SAI have a special relationship, which is legally defined and well-functioning in practice. The SAI is legally required to report regularly and independently to parliament and the public.

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| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

#### Assessment criterion 5: Practice

In practice, the SAI demonstrates its independence, conducts its auditing work thoroughly, and reports regularly and independently to parliament and the public. Parliament systematically scrutinizes SAI reports and takes action as necessary on their findings and recommendations.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-existent[ ]  | Rudimentary [ ]  | Basic[ ]  | Good[ ]  | Very good[ ]  | Excellent[ ]  |
| Evidence for this assessment criterion: |

Recommendations for change

|  |
| --- |
| *Use this space to note down recommendations and ideas for strengthening rules and practice in this area.* |

Sources and further reading

* David Beetham, [*Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*](http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/democracy_en.pdf) (2006).
* International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), [*INTOSAI-P 1: The Lima Declaration*](https://www.issai.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/INTOSAI-P-1-The-Lima-Declaration.pdf), endorsed in 1977, revised edition (2019).
* INTOSAI, [*INTOSAI-P 10: Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence*](https://www.issai.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/INTOSAI-P-10-Mexico-Declaration-on-SAI-Independence.pdf), endorsed in 2007, revised edition (2019).
* INTOSAI, [*INTOSAI-P 12: The Value and Benefits of Supreme Audit Institutions – making a difference to the lives of citizens*](https://www.intosai.org/fileadmin/downloads/documents/open_access/INT_P_11_to_P_99/INTOSAI_P_12/INTOSAI_P_12_en_2019.pdf), endorsed in 2013, revised edition (2019).